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Impairments on ‘‘Open-Ended’’ Executive Function Tests in Autism
Sarah J. White, Paul W. Burgess, and Elisabeth L. Hill
The executive function (EF) theory of autism has received much support recently from a growing number of studies.
However, executive impairments have not always been easy to identify consistently and so novel ‘‘ecologically valid’’
tests have been designed which tap into real-life scenarios that are relevant to and representative of everyday behavior.
One characteristic of many of these tasks is that they present the participant with an ‘‘ill-structured’’ or ‘‘open-ended’’
situation. Here, we investigated the possibility that tasks with greater degrees of open-endedness might prove more
sensitive to detecting executive impairment in autism. Forty-five children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) were
compared to 27 age- and IQ-matched control children on a range of cognitive tests of EF. Group differences were found
on half of the tasks, with the greatest degree of impairment detected on the more open-ended tasks. The ASD group also
performed more poorly on a simple control condition of a task. Detailed consideration of task performance suggested
that the ASD group tended to create fewer spontaneous strategies and exhibit more idiosyncratic behavior, which
particularly disadvantaged them on the more open-ended tasks. These kinds of behaviors have been reported in studies of
neurological patients with frontal lobe involvement, prima facie suggesting a link between the scientific fields. However,
we suggest that this behavior might equally result from a poor understanding of the implicit demands made by the
experimenter in open-ended test situations, due to the socio-communicative difficulties of these children.
Keywords: autism; executive function; ecological validity; open-ended; implicit
Introduction
Executive function (EF) encompasses a wide range of
skills and abilities that have in common their involve-
ment in the higher order control of behavior in order to
accomplish a goal. Executive dysfunction was initially
suggested as a cognitive theory of autism due to
similarities in behavior that were noted between patients
with acquired frontal lobe damage and individuals with
autism, particularly repetitive and socially inappropriate
behavior [Damasio & Maurer, 1978; Ozonoff, Rogers, &
Pennington, 1991; Prior & Hoffmann, 1990; Rumsey,
1985]. Frontal patients commonly have problems with
tasks tapping EFs, including planning, flexibility, inhibi-
tion, working memory, generativity and self-monitoring,
all thought to be involved in producing and maintaining
a problem-solving set for attainment of a future goal
[Duncan, 1986]. However, it has been equally known for
many years that some patients with frontal lobe damage
may show little or no impairment on traditional EF tests
and yet show considerable handicap in everyday life
[Shallice & Burgess, 1991; see Burgess, Alderman, Volle,
Benoit, & Gilbert, 2009 for a review]. This observation
has prompted the recent development of tasks with
enhanced ‘‘ecological validity’’ [see Burgess et al., 2006;
Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & Wallace, 2008 for a
review]. One characteristic of some of these tasks is that
they present the participant with an ‘‘ill-structured’’
problem. In other words, there are many different courses
of action that one might take and participants must
decide for themselves what approach they will take. This
stresses the key executive ability of spontaneous strategy
generation: being able to find for oneself a way of
approaching the task that makes it easier or makes one’s
performance more effective [Burgess & Shallice, 1996a]. It
has been argued that it is this ‘‘open-ended’’ character-
istic that, at least in part, underpins the success of these
tasks in detecting many of the aspects of dysexecutive
behavior that were previously hard to quantify in the
clinic [Burgess et al., 2006].
A growing number of experiments have also reported
deficits in autistic populations on tests of EF [see Hill, 2004
for a review]. However, it has not always proved easy to
replicate findings of executive dysfunction in autism
[Barnard, Muldoon, Hasan, O’Brien, & Stewart, 2008;
Edgin & Pennington, 2005; Goldberg et al., 2005;
Kleinhans, Akshoomoff, & Delis, 2005; Landa & Goldberg,
2005; Minshew, Goldstein, Muenz, & Payton, 1992;
Nyden, Gillberg, Hjelmquist, & Heiman, 1999]. This
should perhaps not be particularly surprising. We now
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wide range of functions, and dissociations between EF
tasks are common [Burgess, 1997; Burgess, Alderman,
Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998; Hughes, 1998; Ozonoff,
1997]. We do not as yet know which of this myriad of
EFs are key in autism though; indeed, it may be that there
is no common impairment across all people with a
diagnosis of autism, just as there is no single common
impairment across all dysexecutive patients with frontal
lobe involvement.
It is important therefore to start moving toward a
characterization of the types of executive task that are
failed by people with autism. One of the dimensions
along which many EF tasks can be classified is in the
degree to which they have this characteristic of ‘‘ill-
structuredness’’ or ‘‘open-endedness.’’ However, there is
at present no single definition of ill-structuredness [Goel,
1995] nor agreement as to which tasks have these
characteristic more than others. Accordingly, we adopt
a pragmatic approach; where an EF task has been
explicitly designed such that there are a number of ways
of doing the task [e.g. Key Search task; Wilson, Evans,
Alderman, Burgess, & Emslie, 1997], or is characterized
explicitly to be open-ended as acknowledged clearly by
the inventor of that task [e.g. the Six Element Test;
Burgess et al., 2006; Shallice & Burgess, 1991], we will
classify this as being high in open-endedness. We will
also attribute this characteristic to those tasks where
failures of spontaneous strategy generation have been
shown to be a root cause of failure in neurological
patients [e.g. Burgess and Shallice, 1996b; Wilson
et al., 1997].
A potential confound for a study of this type is that
tasks high in ecological validity also tend to be those that
are most open-ended, for the reasons outlined above.
Thus any increased sensitivity of these tasks to executive
problems in autism might be due to this characteristic
rather than open-endedness. Accordingly, we included in
our battery a task [Hayling Sentence Completion Test;
Burgess & Shallice, 1996b, 1997] which has been shown
to be open-ended in the way that it can be performed, but
which does not have the characteristic of high ‘‘repre-
sentativeness’’ (i.e. like an activity one might do in
everyday life) and thus is not high in ecologically validity
[see Burgess et al., 2006].
For our tasks with high ecological validity, we have
drawn upon a recently developed neuropsychological
battery of five EF tasks suitable for children: the
Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome for
Children [BADS-C: Emslie, Wilson, Burden, Nimmo-
Smith, & Wilson, 2003]. The tasks in this battery were
designed to be sensitive and suitable for high-functioning
populations who may be compensating for any impair-
ment. The requirement for reading, language skills and
verbal short-term memory are also kept to a minimum by
presenting the task instructions pictorially when possi-
ble. This test battery was specifically designed to assess
everyday difficulties in more ecologically valid situations
than traditional EF tests, such as finding a key in a field or
planning a trip to the zoo. Furthermore, they capture
how an individual is approaching a task, as well as their
success in completing it.
While the use of the BADS-C has not yet been reported
in the literature, the adult version of the test has been
utilized with a range of patient populations. The BADS
therefore appears to be sensitive at detecting executive
dysfunction in schizophrenic patients [Cools, Brouwer,
de Jong, & Slooff, 2000; Evans, Chua, McKenna, &
Wilson, 1997; Ihara, Berrios, & McKenna, 2000, 2003;
Katz, Tadmor, Felzen, & Hartman-Maeir, 2007; Krabben-
dam, de Vugt, Derix, & Jolles, 1999], drug users [Verdejo-
Garcia & Perez-Garcia, 2007; Zakzanis & Young, 2001],
chronic alcoholics [Moriyama et al., 2002], patients with
depression [Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, & Leplow, 2005],
patients with Parkinson’s disease [Kamei et al., 2008]
patients with Alzheimer’s disease [Amanzio, Geminiani,
Leotta, & Cappa, 2008] and patients with traumatic brain
injury [Bach, Happe ´, Fleminger, & David, 2006; Bennett,
Ong, & Ponsford, 2005a,b]. Most of the subtests also
appear to have good test-retest reliability [Jelicic, Hen-
quet, Derix, & Jolles, 2001]. Furthermore, the studies by
Bach et al. [2006] and Verdejo-Garcı ´a and Pe ´rez-Garcı ´a
[2007] support the idea that the BADS may detect EF
impairments that more traditional tests do not.
So far, one study has reported in detail on the
administration of the BADS to adults with Asperger
syndrome (AS) and has successfully detected executive
dysfunction in this population [Hill & Bird, 2006]. These
adults were found to have impairments on the Zoo Map
test, the Action Program/Water task and the Six Ele-
ments/Parts test from the BADS, as well as on the Hayling
Sentence Completion Test [Burgess & Shallice, 1996b,
1997]. More traditional tests of EF were also administered
but these failed to discriminate the adults with AS from
the controls. Furthermore, the authors studied the
individual profiles of each of their participants and found
all but one of their adults with AS to be significantly
impaired on at least one EF test, and performance on
these tests predicted autistic symptoms.
An earlier study reporting reduced overall BADS scores
in adolescents with autism corroborates these results
[Rajendran, Mitchell, & Rickards, 2005]. A second study
administering the Zoo Map task and the Hayling
Sentence Completion Test found impairment in young
adults with autism only on the latter task [Boucher et al.,
2005], in line with our predictions of difficulty on
more open-ended but not on more constrained tasks.
One further study reports on the use of a task similar
to the adult version of the Six Elements test, developed
to be suitable for children [Mackinlay, Charman, &
INSAR White et al./Open-ended executive function tasks in autism 139Karmiloff-Smith, 2006]. This study compared a group
of high-functioning boys with autism to age- and
IQ-matched controls and found impaired performance
on this particularly open-ended task. Participants in the
autism group were less likely than controls to plan a
strategy to complete the task, showed less switching
between tasks and made more rule-breaks. Thus there are
the beginnings of the suggestion that the open-endedness
of a task might be important in determining its sensitivity
to detect executive dysfunction in children with autism.
Accordingly, in this study we contrast performance on
three relatively open-ended measures of EF with perfor-
mance on three EF measures where the demands of the
task are more constrained.
Method
Participants
Ethical approval for the study was received from the Joint
UCL/UCLH committee on the Ethics of Human Research
and consent was obtained from the parents of all
participants prior to inclusion in the study. 45 children
aged 7–12 years with autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
took part, matched to 27 control participants for gender
(w
2(1)52.51), age (t(70)50.90), verbal (t(70)50.95) and
performance IQ (t(70)51.78). These are the same
children that are reported in White, Hill, Happe ´, and
Frith [2009; main experiment] and largely overlap with
those reported in White, O’Reilly, & Frith [2009; experi-
ment 1]. As their IQ scores in Table I indicate, the
children with ASD were an extremely high-functioning
sample and all but two attended a mainstream school.
All these children had previously received a diagnosis
of autism, AS or ASD from a qualified clinician prior to
participation in the study; three also had comorbid
diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and
one of dyspraxia. In addition all met objective criteria for
an ASD on the Developmental, Dimensional and Diag-
nostic Interview [3Di: Skuse et al., 2004] at the time of
this study, while none of the controls did (social,
communication and repetitive behavior domains,
t(66)411, Po0.001). The 3Di measure is similar to the
Autism Diagnostic Interview [ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Le
Couteur, 1994] with which it correlates highly [Skuse
et al., 2004]. None of the control participants were
reported or were known to have any developmental
disorders or family history of such difficulties.
Materials and Procedure
Verbal and performance IQ were measured using the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children [WISC-III-UK:
Wechsler, 1992]. All EF tests were carried out during a
single test session. The full BADS-C was administered and
scored according to the user manual [Emslie et al., 2003],
and consists of the five tests described below [Cards,
Water, Zoo Map, Key Search and Six Parts tests]. Each of
these is designed to tap different aspects of executive
functioning. In addition, a modified version of the
Hayling Sentence Completion Test [Burgess & Shallice,
1997] adapted for children, was administered.
‘‘Constrained’’ Tasks
The Cards task taps into the ability to inhibit a prepotent
response by flexibly shifting from one rule to a new rule
and therefore avoiding perseveration. Here the partici-
pant responds twice to the same set of playing cards,
firstly saying ‘‘yes’’ to red cards and ‘‘no’’ to black cards,
and secondly saying ‘‘yes’’ when the previous card was
the same color as the current one and ‘‘no’’ when it was
different. The number of errors made during the second
set of responses was recorded; these are generally made
rarely. There is little obvious scope in this test for
spontaneous strategy generation or finding alternative
ways of performing the task so this task is classified as
‘‘constrained.’’
The Water task requires the child to plan and carry out a
response in order to solve a multi-step problem concern-
ing the retrieval of a cork from a tall tube, involving
investigation of possible responses at each stage and
evaluation of whether these have helped to get closer to
the solution. Two points were awarded for each of five
stages successfully completed without prompting, with a
one-point penalty subtracted if the child perseverated in
their response or took longer than 200seconds in total.
There is only one possible solution to the task due to the
physical constraints involved, and it is made explicit in
the task instructions what has to be achieved and what
one can and cannot do with the equipment. This task is
also classified therefore as ‘‘constrained.’’
Table I. Mean (and Standard Deviations) for Participant
Characteristics in Both Groups
ASD group Control group
N 45 27
(male:female) (41:4) (21:6)
Age (years) 9.58 9.88
(1.44) (1.32)
Verbal IQ 111 115
(14.70) (15.78)
Performance IQ 98 103
(11.18) (12.35)
Clinical diagnosis 8 Autism —
25 AS
12 ASD
3Di
Social (cut-off 10) 12.71 (4.20) 3.34 (2.00)
Communication (cut-off 8) 14.77 (3.37) 3.73 (1.68)
Repetitive behaviours (cut-off 3) 4.90 (2.40) 0.35 (0.54)
Po0.001.
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the child to plan a solution to a problem that requires the
consideration of a number of rules: visiting only certain
animals and places in a zoo, keeping to the paths and
walking along certain paths only once. Points were
awarded for visiting the animals in an optimal sequence
and were subtracted for breaking any of the rules. Part 2
requires the child to follow a set of instructions while
obeying some simple rules; here the child repeats the task
but is provided with the order in which to visit the
animals, removing most of the planning requirements. In
both parts of this task the contingencies are very explicit,
as is the requirement for strategy development; again,
there is only very limited flexibility in the final solution.
This task is therefore classified as ‘‘constrained.’’
‘‘Open-Ended’’ Tasks
The Key Search task examines the ability to plan an
efficient solution to a problem that is implementable in
everyday life. The child is presented with a picture of a
birds eye view of a field (a square box) and asked to draw
a line to indicate where they would walk in order to
search it for their lost keys. Points were awarded for
strategies that took into account the information pro-
vided about the scenario (five points; e.g. searching only
within the field), that were systematic, planned, and
efficient (eight points; e.g. walking from side to side
across the field), and that were implementable (one
point; e.g. strategies that did not rely on knowing your
precise positioning in the field at an earlier time point).
This task is more ‘‘open-ended’’ than the ‘‘constrained’’
tasks above as there are a number of different ways to
approach the task that are scored equally, or near-equally
and, while the requirement for some kind of strategy is
implied by the task instructions (unlike e.g. with the
Hayling test below), this is not explicit and no guidance
as to the form this should take is given.
The Six Parts Test is derived from the Shallice and
Burgess [1991] Six Element Test. It requires the child to
plan a strategy in order to complete an overall task,
involving carrying out six activities; the child must also
monitor their own progress on each activity in order to
ensure they keep to their plan. The activities consist of
two picture naming tasks, two counting tasks and two
sorting tasks; the child is given 5minutes on a visible
timer and is required to complete something from each
task without performing two tasks of the same type
consecutively. Points were awarded for attempting all six
activities (12 points), were deducted for breaking the
order rule (three points), were awarded for using specific
strategies to achieve these two aims (four points), and
were deducted if the child inefficiently returned to a
particular task three or more times (one point). This task
was explicitly designed to be relatively open-ended in
form [see Burgess et al., 2006 for review]. For instance,
the participants can choose for themselves what order
they do the tasks in and how much time they spend on
each, and no particular strategy is prompted by
the instructions. This task was therefore classified as
‘‘open-ended.’’
Modified Hayling Sentence Completion Task for
Children (MHSCT-C). The Hayling Sentence
Completion Test was first adapted for use with children
by Shallice et al. [2002]. Shallice (unpublished) further
adapted the task to make it even more challenging and
this version, referred to here as the Modified Hayling
Sentence Completion Task for Children (MHSCT-C), was used
in this study. This test requires the generation and
inhibition of verbal responses as well as task switching;
it establishes a prepotent situation by making use of over-
learnt knowledge of sentence endings, thus requiring a
high degree of inhibition to overcome it. During task
administration, the experimenter reads a sentence to the
child with the last word missing and the child must
complete the sentence with a single word. In Part A, the
child must give the correct or most appropriate word,
while in Part B, the child must produce a word that is
unrelated to the sentence, to the missing word or to a
previous answer. These two conditions were alternated,
with the experimenter indicating ‘‘correct’’ trials by
placing their right hand on their lap and ‘‘wrong’’ trials
by holding their right hand up. For the ‘‘correct’’ trials,
the number of inappropriate responses given was
recorded (10 points). For ‘‘wrong’’ trials, three penalty
points were awarded when the correct response was given
or one point when the response was semantically related
to the sentence or the missing word (30 points). After the
task had been administered, children were asked how
they had generated the ‘‘wrong’’ words; specifically,
whether they had used a strategy such as naming
objects around the room or naming objects in a
category, and whether they had thought of these words
before or after they heard the sentence read to them.
Burgess and Shallice [1996b] report in healthy adults the
spontaneous, unprompted, use of a range of strategies in
performing these ‘‘Part B’’ trials. Therefore this test was
classified as relatively ‘‘open-ended.’’
Results
Raw scores were entered into all analyses as a few 7-year
olds were included (BADS-C published scaled scores start
at 8 years). Due to the limited range of test scores,
nonparametric statistics were used to analyze group
differences, except in the case of response time data.
Observation of the group means revealed that the ASD
group was performing worse than the controls on the test
summary scores across all measures (see top row for each
task in Table II). However, significant group differences
between the ASD and control groups were only found on
INSAR White et al./Open-ended executive function tasks in autism 141the open-ended tasks (Key Search task (U5379.5,
P50.007), Six Parts test (U5349, P50.002), MHSCT-C
(U5405.5, P50.018)). In addition, a significant group
difference was observed for the Zoo Map 2 control task
(U5449, P50.028).
Those tests that produced significant differences were
studied in more detail by analyzing group differences on
the subscales that contributed toward the test summary
scores. On the Key Search task, the ASD group was less
able to produce a systematic, planned and efficient search
strategy (U5386.5, P50.007), while the two groups were
equal in understanding the task requirements (U5521.5)
and spent a similar amount of time on the task
(t(66)50.24). For the Six Parts test, the ASD group spent
a longer maximum time on any one subtask than the
controls (t(68.9)52.28, P50.026), while not differing
from them on the number of subtasks attempted
(U5481) or the number of tasks where the order rule
was broken (U5516). The ASD group gave more
inappropriate responses to ‘‘correct’’ trials on the
MHSCT-C (U5420.5, P50.025), was less likely to report
using a strategy (e.g. naming objects in the room) to help
them think of words in the ‘‘wrong’’ trials (w
2(1)513.50,
Po0.001) and was more likely to report thinking of these
words after they had heard the sentence than before
(w
2(1)58.71, P50.003). On the Zoo Map 2 control task,
the ASD group made more rule breaks (U5473.5,
P50.048), while there was no difference in the number
of moves made by the child in the correct sequence
(U5547) or in the time taken for planning before the
first move (t(70)51.03).
In order to obtain more accurate measures of indivi-
dual performance, individual variation in both IQ and
age was taken into account due to significant correlations
between at least one of these variables and the test
summary scores in at least one of the groups (r40.3). This
was done by entering the test summary score for each
task from the control group as the dependent variable in
a regression with age, verbal and performance IQ as
predictor variables. This regression equation was then
applied to the ASD group and residuals were collected
and converted to z-scores in relation to the control
group’s mean and standard deviation; this retained any
ASD-specific age- and IQ-dependent variation within the
ASD group data [see White, Hill, et al., 2009 for previous
use of this procedure]. These values are presented in
Figure 1, which shows that all of the tests produced a tail
of low-performing outliers in the ASD group and this was
the case even for the tests that did not produce
significant group differences. Despite this, it is notable
that only a minority of the children in the ASD group
could be classified as showing deviant performance below
the 5th percentile of control performance on each
measure (any control outliers performing more than
1.65 standard deviations below the control mean were
removed in order to obtain a better estimate of normal
performance (procedure as in Hill & Bird, 2006; White
et al., 2006); this was only 1–2 controls and slightly
increased the probability of detecting deviant performers;
all participants are included in Fig. 1). This proportion
ranged from 18% (Cards task) to 42% (Key Search task),
with the most outliers on the tasks that produced
significant group differences. 13% of children in the
ASD group showed intact performance across all seven
tests, 31% showed impairment on one test, 18% on two
tests, 20% on three tests, 16% on four tests and 2% on
five tests compared to 67% showing intact performance,
26% showing impairment on one test and 7% on two
tests in the control group. Furthermore, performance in
the ASD group spanned the full range of the control
performance, with some children performing particularly
well above the top of the control range on all but the
MHSCT-C.
Relationships between these summary variables
accounting for age and IQ and the social, communication
and repetitive behavior domains of the 3Di were
examined in each group separately. No such relationships
were found in the ASD group, but within the control
group, relationships were found between the commu-
nication subscale and both the Key Search task
Table II. Mean (and Standard Deviations) for Performance
Across the EF Tests (Note that Negative Scores Are Possible on
Some Tests)
ASD group Control group
Constrained tasks
Cards task (errors in set 2) 1.47 (2.37) 0.93 (1.44)
Water task (max 10) 6.89 (3.14) 7.81 (2.39)
Zoo Map 1 (max 8) 0.09 (5.09) 1.74 (4.45)
Zoo Map 2 (max 8) 6.16 (3.27) 7.56 (1.16)
No. of moves in correct
sequence (max 8)
7.49 (1.46) 7.93 (0.38)
No. of rule breaks 1.22 (2.13) 0.37 (1.11)
Time before making first
move (secs)
6.67 (8.85) 4.63 (5.62)
Open-ended tasks
Key Search task (max 14) 5.98 (4.65) 9.11 (4.15)
Task understanding (max 5) 3.80 (0.92) 4.07 (0.47)
Efficient planning (max 8) 1.87 (3.94) 4.44 (3.65)
Time spent on task (secs) 79.79 (47.94) 78.68 (45.89)
Six Parts test (max 16) 10.60 (2.94) 12.59 (2.79)
Max time on any subtask
(secs)
108.84 (66.18) 75.89 (52.08)
No. of subtasks
attempted (max 6)
5.20 (1.69) 5.59 (1.12)
No. of rule breaks (max 3) 0.63 (0.79) 1.04 (1.19)
MHSCT-C (total errors) 9.29 (6.03) 6.15 (2.92)
‘‘Correct’’ trial errors 2.13 (1.93) 1.22 (1.25)
‘‘Wrong’’ trial errors 7.16 (5.36) 4.93 (2.84)
Strategy use (% of children) 20 63
Generating word before
sentence (% of children)
13 44
Po0.05, Po0.01, Po0.001.
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P50.018) and also between the repetitive behavior
subscale and the MHSCT-C (r50.47, P50.013).
Discussion
Consistent with previous studies in autism [Boucher
et al., 2005; Hill & Bird, 2006; Mackinlay et al., 2006;
Rajendran et al., 2005], executive dysfunction was found
in the ASD group across a number of tasks from a novel
ecologically valid neuropsychological EF battery suitable
for children [Emslie et al., 2003], as well as a sentence
completion task. Those tests showing significant group
differences were the Key Search task and Six Parts test
from the BADS-C and the MHSCT-C, as well as the Zoo
Map 2 control test. These findings closely parallel those
from the adult version of the BADS in adults with AS,
particularly on the Six Parts test and the MHSCT-C
[Boucher et al., 2005; Hill & Bird, 2006]. It is notable that
all of the ‘‘open-ended’’ tasks produced group differences,
while none of the more constrained tasks did (we will
address the issue of the Zoo-Map part 2 control task later).
While significant group differences were observed on
only the open-ended tests, the ASD group means were
consistently lower than those of the control group across
all tasks. From examination of individual performance, a
fairly consistent pattern was seen across the tests: a tail of
children in the ASD group was performing below the
control range but the majority of children with ASD
performed similarly to the controls. While we can be
reasonably certain that these deviant performers had
problems with the tasks, it is possible that some of the
other children within the control group range also had
difficulties but were compensating to some extent.
Remarkably, some children in the ASD group were
performing above the control range of scores, suggesting
that executive abilities were truly intact in at least some
children; as age and IQ were accounted for in these
measures, this could not be explained by such variables.
This is comparable to recent findings in adults with AS
[Towgood, Meuwese, Gilbert, & Burgess, submitted].
Furthermore, 13% of children with ASD showed intact
performance across all seven tests (compared to 67% of
controls), again a remarkable achievement on their part
suggestive of truly retained ability or possibly of abnor-
mal functional specialization [Towgood et al., submitted].
The group differences that were found to be significant
were those with the greatest number of deviant perfor-
mers, indicating that these children were driving the
group differences and that these open-ended tasks
appeared to be more sensitive at detecting difficulties
than others. There was little consistency, however, in the
particular children performing poorly across tests, with
different children finding different tasks difficult. This
suggests caution when considering any hypothesis
attempting to pinpoint a single cause of poor perfor-
mance across these tasks. Nevertheless, a relatively
consistent problem in dealing with open-ended situa-
tions was suggested by performances at the individual
level. For instance, some children in the ASD group
tended not to spontaneously produce an efficient
strategy in the Key Search task but were relatively
unimpaired in their understanding of the task require-
ments and took these into account in their responses.
While this might indicate difficulties with planning or
impulsivity, it is also interesting to note that in this test,
children are not explicitly instructed to produce an
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ASD group gave incorrect answers when they were
supposed to finish the sentence appropriately; again, this
may be explained by perseveration or task switching
difficulties, but it is also possible that they had difficulties
following the experimenter’s hand cue signalling the
different trial types. In addition, some children with ASD
showed a lack of planning in their wrong answers on the
MHSCT-C, being less likely to produce a strategy to aid
them in the ‘‘wrong’’ condition and more likely to
generate their answers after they heard the sentence; it is
again interesting to note that the task does not explicitly
ask for the production of such a strategy.
In the Six Parts test, the maximum time spent on any
one subtask was longer in the ASD group than in the
controls, although they attempted as many subtasks and
broke as few rules. Rather than spending longer across all
subtasks and therefore not managing to complete as
many, it appears that some children in the ASD group
were spending less time on some tasks in order to spend
more time on others. Exactly this same pattern of
performance was also reported in the previous study
with adults with AS using this test [Hill & Bird, 2006].
Anecdotally, a few children in the ASD group verbalized
this intention during the test session, stating that they
were uninterested in spending time on tasks they did not
enjoy, preferring to focus on one favorite task. While this
strategy is not maladaptive and again complies with the
explicit task instructions, it is obviously a consistent
difference between the two groups. The unconstrained
tasks used here do allow some latitude in the way they are
performed; indeed, it is characteristic of ‘‘open-ended
tasks’’ that there are many ways of approaching them.
However what constitutes successful performance overall
is made very explicit indeed; so while it might be true
that the ASD group used different strategies or ap-
proaches from the controls and thus may have performed
the task differently (and in some cases better), they also
performed less adequately in a normative sense [see
Mottron, Dawson, & Soulie `res, 2008 for a discussion of
this issue]. This kind of idiosyncratic responding has been
noted in the performance of neurological patients with
known or suspected frontal lobe involvement [e.g.
Burgess & Shallice, 1996a; Alderman, Burgess, Knight, &
Henman, 2003]. However, the reasons for this behavior
in either neurological patients or in ASD are, to our
knowledge, not known.
For the Zoo Map 2 test, some children with ASD made
fewer moves in the correct sequence. This was an
unexpected result, and is curious for two reasons: first,
because the groups did not differ significantly on this
measure for the more difficult Zoo Map 1; second,
because the sequence was actually provided for them
in the Zoo Map 2 test, while it was not for Zoo Map 1.
The control children found this additional information a
great aid, performing Zoo Map 2 close to perfectly, while
finding Zoo Map 1 similarly challenging to the ASD
group. Interestingly, a few children spontaneously re-
marked on their performance, for example, after visiting
the animals in the wrong order, ‘‘I always go and see the
lions first as I’m a cat lover’’; when visiting only 5 of the 8
specified locations, ‘‘I’ll save the others for another day’’;
‘‘I don’t need to visit the cafe ´ as I’m organized and I’ve
brought a picnic with me’’; and after missing the cafe ´,
‘‘I’ll visit the cafe ´ last as I’ll be hungry then.’’ Again, these
could be described as idiosyncratic responses.
Why should children with ASD perform especially
poorly on open-ended executive tasks? There would
appear to be two most likely explanations. The first is
that ASD (at least for some cases) is characterized by a
pertubation in the cognitive systems of the brain that
usually enable people to determine optimal courses of
action in ‘‘ill-structured’’situations. It has been proposed,
on the grounds of both human lesion and functional
neuroimaging evidence, that such a system is supported
at least in part by the most rostral parts of the prefrontal
cortex (PFC), approximating the frontal pole [see Burgess,
Gilbert & Dumontheil, 2007 for a review]. Burgess,
Dumontheil and Gilbert [2007] propose that the rostral
PFC supports an attentional ‘‘gateway’’ that is required
when we wish to disengage our attention from our
immediate environment in order to be able to mull over a
number of potential courses of action. Thus this system is
particularly required when dealing with open-ended
situations, where many possible courses of action are
possible. In support of a link between rostral PFC
function and ASD, there is neuroimaging evidence of
functional disturbance in rostral prefrontal cortex in
adults with high-functioning ASD [e.g. Castelli, Frith,
Happe ´, & Frith, 2002; Gilbert, Bird, Brindley, Frith, &
Burgess, 2008; Gilbert, Meuwese, Towgood, Frith, &
Burgess, 2009] and in a variety of developmental
disorders [see Dumontheil, Burgess, & Blakemore, 2008].
A second explanation might instead suggest that
failures on the open-ended tests are because these present
situations where the participant needs to be guided by an
implicit understanding of what the experimenter wants,
and a keen appreciation of the social contingencies
involved in different strategy choices; such a suggestion
has recently been hinted at by Kenworthy et al. [2008].
A related proposition might be that these children may
not have the desire to conform to social scripts of how to
behave appropriately in particular social situations. Such
behavior could be described as egocentric, a term that has
previously been related to autism [Frith, 2004; Frith &
de Vignemont, 2005]. On this account, the open-ended
nature of the tasks failed here allowed a proportion of the
present children with ASD the freedom to impose their
own task demands on the test situation. In support of this
possibility, Ozonoff [1995] found that individuals with
144 White et al./Open-ended executive function tasks in autism INSARautism performed as well as controls on an EF test when
presented in a computerized format but not when
presented by an experimenter in a normal testing
situation. Furthermore, as Russell suggests [Biro &
Russell, 2001; Russell, 1997], EF tasks commonly impose
arbitrary rules on individuals and this certainly applies to
the tasks included here (being asked to obey unusual
rules about how to walk around a zoo or being expected
to divide your time equally between tasks when some are
more preferable than others). While difficulties with
arbitrary rules may be due to a lack of verbal self-
prompting as suggested by Russell, it is also possible that
certain individuals with ASD are not aware of the social
expectation to comply with such arbitrary rules, impos-
ing their own desires instead. This hypothesis may even
go some way toward explaining the association seen
between Theory of Mind and EF tasks in ASD populations
[Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Ozonoff, Pennington, &
Rogers, 1991; Pellicano, 2007].
These explanations may not be mutually exclusive. Nor
need the unusual behavior we have observed here
necessarily be prompted exclusively by tasks that are
designed to be open-ended. In this way, the ASD groups’
performance on the Zoo-Map Part 2 task is instructive.
This task could not be said to be ‘‘open-ended’’ at all, yet
there was some aspect to it that provoked unusual
behavior in this group. It is too early to say whether this
deficit is causally linked to those that were demonstrated
on the open-ended tasks, or is in effect epiphenomenal.
But, much as the evidence here supported the hypothesis
that children with high-functioning ASD would perform
most poorly on open-ended tasks of EF, this unexpected
result does caution against a simple single explanation of
the characteristics of all tasks that might be performed
poorly by them.
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